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ver the past two decades, the phenomenal
growth of financial market and trading
activities worldwide has led to tremen-
dous growth in large-value payments systems.
Large-value payments systems are the elec-
tronic systems banks use to transfer large pay-
ments among themselves.
1 Payment orders
processed in such systems in the United States,
for example, are typically well above $1 million.
The tremendous growth of payments system
use throughout the world has increased both the
possibility of settlement failures and the poten-
tial impact of such failures. Two decades ago,
the risks were relatively low. For example, the
daily payment flow of foreign exchange trans-
actions was roughly the same magnitude as the
capital stock of a large U.S. bank. In 1996,
however, the average daily turnover exceeded
the combined capital of the top 100 U.S. banks.
Regulators are especially concerned that pay-
ments systems might turn a local financial crisis
into a global systemic crisis.
This article examines settlement risk in large-
value payments systems and discusses some of
the measures available to manage such risk. The
first section describes the features of the two
primary types of large-value payments systems.
The second section discusses the three different
forms of settlement risk—credit risk, unwinding
risk, and liquidity risk. The third section examines
some of the measures that have been adopted to
manage settlement risk, pointing out the merits
of these measures as well as tradeoffs between
their costs and their ability to reduce risk.
I. WHAT ARE LARGE-VALUE
PAYMENTS SYSTEMS?
Payments systems are the infrastructure of the
modern business world. All business and finan-
cial transactions involve monetary payments.
2 A
transaction which is not paid in cash (currency
bills and coins) has to be paid by transferring
funds from the buyer’s bank account to the
seller’s bank account. If both the buyer and
seller have accounts with the same bank, this
can be done easily through the bank: the bank
simply debits the buyer’s account and credits
the seller’s account by the same amount. But if
the buyer and seller use different banks, which
is usually the case, the funds transfer, that is,
settlement, has to be accomplished by using a
payments system.
A payments system works like a bank’s bank.
All member banks of a payments system hold
accounts with deposits that can be used as clearing
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member banks are settled by simultaneously
debiting and crediting the respective accounts
of paying and receiving banks. For example,
suppose a California insurance company, Pacific
Insurance Group, buys $20 million in Treasury
bonds from a Wall Street security firm, Atlantic
Securities Company. Because Pacific and Atlantic
use different banks, Pacific’s payment to Atlan-
tic must be accomplished through a payments
system by using banks who are members of the
same system. Pacific pays its bank $20 million,
which in turn pays Atlantic’s bank $20 million
through the payments system, just as a buyer
pays a seller when they have a common bank.
Atlantic’s bank then pays Atlantic $20 million.
There are two types of large-value payments
systems in operation. One is a real time gross
settlement, or RTGS, system. The other is a peri-
odic multilateral netting system. In the United
States, the two major large-value payments sys-
tems are Fedwire, an RTGS system, and CHIPS,
a netting system.
RTGS systems
The single most important feature of an RTGS
system is that it provides instant settlement with
finality as soon as a payment instruction arrives,
provided that sufficient funds are available in
the account of the sending bank. Settlement
refers to the actual transfer of funds from a sending
bank to a receiving bank. Finality means that the
settlement is unconditional and irrevocable. In
an RTGS system, real time means that payment
instructions are executed continuously, at the
instant they enter the system, while gross settle-
ment means that for each payment instruction,
the total gross amount of funds is transferred. 
In the United States, Fedwire is an RTGS
system with nearly 7,000 active member banks,
all of which hold reserve accounts at Federal
Reserve Banks. Operated by the Federal Reserve
System, Fedwire currently processes nearly
$1 trillion in payments on an average day, or
roughly ten times as much as 20 years ago.
3
Fedwire is used mainly for interbank payments,
many of which are related to federal funds trans-
actions or payments for the purchases of govern-
ment securities. 
A typical Fedwire transaction takes only a
few seconds. Suppose that in the previous
example the banks of both Pacific Insurance and
Atlantic Securities belong to Fedwire. Once
Fedwire receives the payment instruction of
$20 million from Pacific’s bank, the bank’s
account at the Federal Reserve will be debited
$20 million while the account of Atlantic’s bank
at the Federal Reserve will be credited $20 mil-
lion. Once this funds transfer is completed, the
payment is said to be settled. Fedwire sends an
electronic message to Atlantic’s bank to confirm
the settlement.
Outside the United States, there are currently
only a few RTGS systems, two of which are the
Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) system and the
Clearing House Automated Payment System
(CHAPS) in the United Kingdom. SIC has been
in full operation for more than ten years, while
CHAPS was just recently converted to an RTGS
system. However, many more RTGS systems
are planned to be introduced in European Union
countries in the near future. Some Asian coun-
tries are considering RTGS systems as well.
Netting systems
In contrast to RTGS systems, settlements in
netting systems do not occur immediately when
payment instructions are sent. Typically, when a
netting system receives a payment instruction,
the system immediately informs the receiver if
the instruction meets certain criteria. But the
actual settlements are not accomplished until the
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payment messages, the system calculates the net
payments, or settlement obligations, for each
participant and informs the participants of their
obligations. The funds transfers are then made
and settlements are achieved.
Table 1 uses a three-bank example to show
how a netting system processes payments for its
member banks. The column under each bank
shows payment instructions received by the
bank during the day from each bank across the
row. For example, the first column shows that
Ash Bank has received payment instructions
during the day from Birch Bank for $10 million
and from Cedar Bank for $20 million. The total
credit row shows the sum of the payments each
bank in the column received during the day. The
total debit column shows the sum of the pay-
ments each bank in the row instructed the system
to pay during the day. These numbers are copied
to the total debit row. After the cutoff time, the
difference between the total credit and total
debit is calculated for each bank. This difference
is called the net position. If the net position is
positive, it represents the amount owed to the
bank at the settlement time. A negative net
position, shown in parentheses in the table, rep-
resents the amount of the payment due from the
bank.
4 The net position of each column bank is
shown in the last row of the table. 
The table illustrates the primary difference
between RTGS and netting systems. In an RTGS
system, each payment in the first three rows
would be settled as soon as the payment instruc-
tion is sent. In a netting system, however, the
system informs the receivers and keeps track of
all payment instructions during the day, but the
actual funds transfers are only made at end of
the day. In the example shown in the table, Cedar
Bank pays the payment system $10 million at
the end of day, and the system then transfers $5
million to the accounts of both Ash and Birch.
The most important implication of the differ-
ence between RTGS and netting systems is that
netting systems only have conditional finality.
In a well-organized netting system, payment
instructions sent to the systems are not allowed
to be revoked once they have been accepted by
the system and released to the receiving banks.
In this sense, netting systems have finality. But
this finality is only conditional, depending on
the absence of a settlement failure. A settlement
failure occurs if one or more members of the
netting system default on their settlement obli-
gations and the system does not have sufficient
funds to cover the shortfalls. If a settlement
failure occurs, a netting system has to allow its
participants to revoke all or part of the payment
instructions sent during the day. Thus, the final-
ity in a netting system is conditioned on the
success of settlement at the end of the day.
Another distinguishing feature of netting sys-
tems is that they need not be run by a settlement
agent. Functionally, a netting system can be
separated into two parts: a clearinghouse and a
settlement agent. The clearinghouse records all
payment instructions, checks whether the in-
structions satisfy certain specific rules and con-
ditions, and if so, releases them to receiving
participants. At the end of the day, the clearing-
house calculates the net settlement obligations
for each member and informs them of their
obligations. The settlement agent then accom-
plishes the actual funds transfers. Consequently,
the function of the clearinghouse can be oper-
ated by any organization, bank or nonbank, pri-
vate or public. On the other hand, a settlement
agent is a bank’s bank, which makes a country’s
central bank the natural choice for this role.
5 In
contrast to a netting system, an RTGS system is
usually operated by its settlement agent because
the system requires continuous, or real time,
settling. Thus, in an RTGS system, it is not
practical to separate the operation of the system
from its settlement agent.
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system in terms of processing value is the Clearing
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS).
CHIPS is a netting system with roughly 100 U.S.
banks and U.S. branches of foreign-based banks
from about 30 countries. CHIPS is privately owned
and managed by the member banks of the New
York Clearing House Association. All CHIPS
members are directly linked through a computer
network. Currently, CHIPS processes more than
$1.2 trillion in payment orders on an average day,
which is almost 20 times as much as two decades
ago. The system is designed to facilitate pay-
ments among its member banks, especially dollar
payments generated by foreign exchange trans-
actions. CHIPS has a settlement account at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and uses the
Federal Reserve System as its settlement agent.
In most European countries, netting systems
have historically been the predominant choice
for large-value payments. Many central banks in
these countries, however, are now planning
either to introduce RTGS systems or convert
some existing netting systems to RTGS systems.
The main reason behind this strategy is the con-
cern for settlement risk, especially for unwind-
ing risk, in netting systems. 
II. WHAT IS SETTLEMENT RISK?
Settlement risk refers to the risk that financial
losses may occur when payments systems are
used for settlement. Settlement risk appears in
different forms to different payment arrange-
ments or payments systems. There are mainly
three forms of settlement risk: credit risk, un-
winding risk, and  liquidity risk.
Credit risk
In general, credit risk is the risk that a payer
might lose all or part of its payment due to the
counterparty’s failure to deliver its promised
payment. All business transactions involve two
sides. One side of the transaction generally
makes a monetary payment, such as dollars. The
other side pays goods or services in a business
transaction, stocks or bonds in a security trans-
action, or currencies in a foreign exchange trans-
Table 1
A NETTING PAYMENT SYSTEM
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Paying bank Receiving bank
ASH BIRCH CEDAR Total debit
A S H 1 51 02 5
BIRCH 10 10
CEDAR 20 20
Total credit 30 15 10
Total debit 25 10 20
Net payment bank receives
(owes) at settlement 5 5 (10)
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYaction. Credit risk arises when the two sides of
a transaction do not pay simultaneously. 
In payments systems, it is useful to separate
credit risk into two types: first payer risk and
receiver risk. First payer risk is the risk that the
party who pays first might not receive the cor-
responding payment from the counterparty. A
first payer is exposed to the credit risk until the
payment due from the counterparty is received
with finality. First payer risk is not unique to
payments systems;  it exists in any transactions
when there is a first payer. Receiver risk arises
when a receiver assumes that a received pay-
ment is final before it actually is and therefore
pays its side of the obligation with finality. In
this way, the receiver actually becomes a first
payer and assumes first payer risk. Receiver risk
is more common in payments systems than in
other types of business. For example, in a netting
system, an institution may assume the payments
it receives are final. But in actuality, the institu-
tion is extending credit to the sender and the
payment is final only when the settlements occur
at the end of the day. 
Receiver risk also exists in an RTGS system
because institutions can be indirect users. An
indirect user is not a member of the payments
system, but uses a bank that is a member. For
example, both Pacific Insurance Group and
Atlantic Security Company in the transaction
discussed earlier are indirect users. An indirect
user is exposed to receiver risk due to the time
lag between the time its bank receives a payment
and the time the bank notifies its customer, the
final receiver. For example, it is currently com-
mon practice for a bank to notify its customers
of funds transfers after a one-day delay. Since
payments systems have worked well histori-
cally, many indirect users simply assume a pay-
ment instruction is settled the day it arrives. If
such an assumption is mistaken, however, the
indirect user will not find out its error until a full
day later. In the earlier example, Atlantic might
deliver the Treasury bond to Pacific with finality
but learn the next day that the expected wire
transfer from Pacific did not arrive the day before.
Thus, current business practice exposes indirect
users of an RTGS system to receiver risk. 
While credit risk is a common concern in most
business transactions, it is easy to overlook such
risk in payments systems. It may be overlooked
because such extension of credit is not inten-
tional but arises from routine payment opera-
tions. Also, the extension of credit is perceived
by many as for a very short term, less than a day.
This perception can be mistaken, however,
since the actual exposure is often longer than a
day when accounting for the risks to indirect
users. Because the sizes of such exposure tend
to be large, credit risk in payments systems is
both real and significant.
Credit risk is especially acute in foreign
exchange transactions since payments systems
in different countries need to be involved. For
example, suppose that Bank of Potomac sells
180 million English pounds to the Bank of
Thames for 100 million U.S. dollars. Because
payments systems currently process only the
home country’s currency, the dollar side of the
transaction has to be settled in the United States
and the pound side in Britain, through foreign
branch offices of the two banks.
6 Specifically,
Potomac’s branch office in England transfers
180 million pounds to Thames through CHAPS,
the British large-value payments system, while
Thames’s branch office in the United States
transfers $100 million to Potomac through
CHIPS. Since different countries are often in
different time zones, the time lag between the
settlement of the two sides of currency payments
is likely to be substantial. The difference between
London time and New York time, for example,
is five hours, so when CHIPS settles, CHAPS
has been closed for hours. In fact, a recent survey
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risk exposure could last more than a couple of
days.
7 Further, since the sizes of the transactions
tend to be large, the potential losses can be severe.
The credit risk in foreign exchange transac-
tions is illustrated by the failure of Bankhaus
Herstatt in 1974. Since then, this risk has often
been referred to as “Herstatt risk.”  Herstatt was
a small German bank that was involved in many
foreign exchange transactions when it failed.
The closure of the bank was announced on June
24 at 3:30 p.m. German time, or 10:30 a.m. New
York time.
8 The cutoff time for the German
payments system was two hours earlier, at 1:30
p.m. local time. Thus, banks that had sold deut-
sche marks to Herstatt for U.S. dollars for set-
tlement on June 24 had already irrevocably paid
Herstatt the marks, expecting to receive the U.S.
dollar payments from Herstatt through CHIPS
later in the day. But because Herstatt was closed
before the dollar side of the transaction was
settled on CHIPS, Herstatt’s counterparties—
the first payers—did not receive the dollar pay-
ments, and therefore faced the prospect of losing
the full value of their mark payments.
9
Although credit risk is present in both RTGS
and netting systems, in general, it is smaller in
netting systems.
10  The difference depends largely
on the amount of “cross traffic” a user has with
other members of the netting system. High cross
traffic means the netted amount of payment due or
owed would be relatively small, resulting in
relatively little credit risk exposure. On the other
hand, a bank with little cross traffic would not
benefit much from netting and thus would be
exposed to relatively more credit risk. Using the
example in Table 1, the exposures of Ash, Birch,
and Cedar are $5 million, $5 million, and $10
million, respectively. If instead they had used
an RTGS system, their credit risk could have
reached $25 million, $10 million, and $20 mil-
lion, as shown in the total debit column. 
Unwinding risk
Unwinding risk arises because the payment
instructions released to receivers may ultimately
be revoked, or unwound. Unwinding occurs
when there is a settlement failure in a netting
system and the payment instructions accumu-
lated during the day are allowed to be revoked.
Unwinding risk is only a concern in netting
systems, where it is a major risk for both indi-
vidual users and regulators.
Unwinding can be costly to an affected insti-
tution in three ways. First, a user of a netting
system may have paid some of its obligations
with finality through other systems. If the user’s
counterparties’ payments are unwound, the user
becomes a first payer in such transactions and is
exposed to first payer risk at least overnight.
Second, many of the transactions unwound
might have to be renegotiated, which means the
institution could lose all gains from these trans-
actions for that day. And third, there are likely
to be indirect costs to affected parties. For ex-
ample, unwinding in one payments system may
make it difficult for an institution to fulfill its
obligations in other settlements systems, which
could require extensive resources to mitigate.
Suppose, for example, in a foreign exchange
transaction between Japanese yen and U.S. dol-
lars, an unwinding in a yen payments system
causes nondelivery of the dollars. The nondeliv-
ery may cause the bank expecting the dollar
payment difficulty in fulfilling its dollar pay-
ment obligations.
In contrast to credit risk, unwinding risk is
hard to measure and even harder to manage
without collective arrangements. Managing
credit risk requires an individual user to know
the creditworthiness only of its counterparties.
Managing unwinding risk, however, requires an
individual user to know the creditworthiness of
all members of the same netting system because
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default on its settlement obligations. 
Table 2 shows why unwinding risk can be hard
to manage. The structure of the table is similar
to Table 1. A row of funds available for clearing
purposes for each bank is added. Assume these
banks use a netting system that only settles at the
end of the day. The top half of the table shows
that at the end of the day all banks except Cedar
Bank are able to fulfill their settlement obliga-
tions. Cedar cannot because it has a net debit
payment of $10 million due but has only $2
million in funds available. If the payments
system cannot come up with the necessary
funds to cover the shortfall, it has to let Cedar
unwind. But Cedar’s unwinding creates a
problem for Ash Bank. The bottom half of the
table shows the settlement obligation to each
remaining bank after Cedar’s payment instruc-
tions are unwound. Now Ash has a $5 million
payment due with only $2 million in funds avail-
able. Thus, Ash cannot fulfill its settlement
obligations, leading to a total unwinding in the
system.
This example highlights the fact that in a
netting system, unwinding risk exposes every
user to every other user’s risk. In the example,
Birch Bank has no direct business dealings with
Cedar; nevertheless, it is affected by Cedar’s
inability to pay its settlement obligations through
the resulting chain reaction. Such broad expo-
sure is the fundamental difference between
unwinding risk and credit risk.
Unwinding risk is also a systemic risk because,
when it occurs, it tends to affect many institu-
tions. When there is a settlement failure, a net-
ting system usually allows affected participants
to withdraw their payment instructions sent
during the day.
11 But these withdrawals will
further affect more participants, who in turn are
allowed to revoke their payment instructions.
This chain reaction can potentially continue,
resulting in an unpredictable but perhaps wide
ranging unwinding. To alleviate the uncertainty,
some netting systems simply unwind the entire
day’s transactions if a settlement failure occurs.
Either total or partial unwinding is likely to
affect many participants and cause large-scale
disruption to payment flows as well as to the
operation and stability of financial markets. To
understand the magnitude of the cost of unwind-
ing, imagine what would happen if, for example,
CHIPS were to unwind. Although unwinding
has never happened on CHIPS, more than 200,000
transactions with total value over $1.2 trillion
would be reversed on a typical day. Unwinding
on this scale could shake the confidence of busi-
ness and investors in the stability of the entire
payments system structure, thereby turning a




Liquidity risk is the risk that payment instruc-
tions cannot be executed (in an RTGS system)
or settled (in a netting system) due to the lack
of liquidity, even though the involved parties
are fundamentally sound. A bank could be in
solid financial shape, but it may not be able to
pay its settlement obligations, say, because of a
temporary breakdown in the communications
between its branch offices caused by a snow
storm. For example, a branch that was supposed
to sell a loan portfolio to obtain the settlement
funds might not be able to do so. In other lines
of business transactions, this temporary liquid-
ity shortfall may not cause significant difficul-
ties. But for a payments system and its
participants, immediate liquidity at settlement
time is crucial. For this reason, liquidity risk is
a special concern to payments systems. 
While liquidity risk exists in all payments
systems, it is more acute in RTGS systems
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 51because gross settlement systems need much
more funds—liquidity—to settle. For example,
in Table 1, as long as Cedar Bank has $10 million
in funds available, all four transactions can be
settled in the netting system. But if a gross
settlement system is used instead, each bank
needs as much liquidity as the gross amount of
payment to settle. Ash needs $25 million in
liquidity, Birch needs $10 million, and Cedar
needs $20 million. Gridlock will occur if all of
them lack sufficient liquidity.
13
Liquidity risk can be reduced, or even elimi-
nated, if all members of a payments system hold
ample amounts of liquidity, such as cash or
reserve balances that can be used for clearing
purposes. But liquidity is costly to its holders;
funds held as cash or reserve balances do not
earn interest income. Thus, there is a tradeoff
between minimizing liquidity risk and minimiz-
ing liquidity cost. As a result, from a bank’s




UNWINDING AND CHAIN REACTIONS IN A NETTING SYSTEM
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Paying bank Receiving bank
ASH BIRCH CEDAR Total debit
A S H 1 51 02 5
BIRCH 10 10
CEDAR 20 20
Total credit 30 15 10
Total debit 25 10 20
Net payment bank receives
(owes) at settlement 5 5 (10)
Funds available for clearing 
purposes 2 2 2
Paying bank Receiving bank
ASH BIRCH Total debit
ASH 15 15
BIRCH 10 10
Total credit 10 15
Total debit 15 10
Net payment bank receives
(owes) at settlement
(5) 5
Funds available for clearing
purposes 2 2
52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYIn an RTGS system, liquidity risk highlights
the fact that every participant is exposed to every
other participant’s risk. Liquidity risk is a systemic
risk since one participant’s liquidity shortfall can
lead to liquidity shortfalls for its counterparties
who have counted on the incoming payments as
their clearing liquidity. Such chain reactions can
lead to a systemic liquidity shortfall. Unlike in a
netting system, where liquidity is only an issue
at end of the day, in an RTGS system, a liquidity
shortage at any time would slow down the sys-
tem’s processing or, in the worst case, bring the
entire system to a halt—failure.
15 In an RTGS
system, any time is settlement time. 
The experiences of the Swiss Interbank Clear-
ing system highlight the importance of liquidity
in an RTGS system. Member banks of the SIC
system need sizable clearing balances to process
payments because the system does not provide
intraday liquidity. If a sending bank does not
have a large enough clearing balance to fulfill
its payments, the payment instructions will be
queued until the funds are available.
16 Obvi-
ously, incoming payments in such a system are
an important source of liquidity. To facilitate
such liquidity in the system, SIC uses a price
mechanism to encourage early payment. As a
result, almost half of the daily payment instruc-
tions are sent to the system before its opening.
Nevertheless, on an average day, at least 45
percent of payments experience some delay in
their execution due to the lack of liquidity.
17 In
a sense, liquidity shortages keep the SIC system
from being a truly real time system.
In sum, settlement risk takes the forms of
credit risk, unwinding risk, and liquidity risk
(Table 3). Credit risk is a bilateral risk that is
present in all payments systems, although it is
usually smaller in netting systems. In fact, credit
risk is ultimately the fundamental source of
settlement risk because, without it, there would
be no unwinding risk or liquidity risk. For exam-
ple, in Table 2, if Cedar Bank were fundamen-
tally sound and had only a temporary liquidity
shortage, it should easily be able to obtain over-
night loans from the other banks. In this case,
Cedar would be able to fulfill its settlement
obligations (which become zero), which would
eliminate the liquidity and unwinding risk.
The severity of unwinding risk and liquidity
risk varies with the type of payments system.
Unwinding risk is a major source of risk only in
netting systems. Although liquidity risk exists in
both RTGS and netting systems, it is a major
source of risk only in RTGS systems. The unique
feature of these two risks in settlement systems is
that they expose an institution not only to bilateral
risks with its counterparties, but also to risks with
every other user of the same payments system.
III.MANAGING SETTLEMENT RISK
Recognizing that both RTGS and netting sys-
tems are exposed to settlement risk, regulators
and the private sector have been working to
reduce the risk. Some of the measures available
are relatively straightforward and can be imple-
mented by individual institutions. For example,
the length of time between a bank receiving a
fund transfer for its customer and notifying the
customer could be reduced from one or more
days to just minutes, virtually eliminating credit
risk to receivers in RTGS systems. Clearly,
adopting this measure only requires the coop-
eration of two participants.
18 Other measures,
however, require systemwide efforts. This sec-
tion will examine and compare some of the risk
management measures that require systemwide
cooperation.
19 
Credit and liquidity risk in RTGS systems
Settlement risk in RTGS systems consists of
credit risk and liquidity risk (Table 3). The pri-
mary method to reduce credit risk is delivery-
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method to reduce liquidity risk is central bank
provision of intraday liquidity.
Delivery-versus-payment (DVP). DVP elimi-
nates the credit risk inherent in a transaction
because it requires both payments in the trans-
action to occur with finality at exactly the same
time. To incorporate DVP in, say, security trans-
actions, links between a real time monetary
clearing system (an RTGS payments system)
and a real time security clearing system are
established to ensure that a purchasing party will
pay at the same time that the counterparty deliv-
ers its promised securities. The Federal Reserve
has established such a mechanism between Fed-
wire and the government security clearing sys-
tem. Similarly, the Swiss Interbank Clearing
system has established links with SECOM, an
electronic book-entry system for transfer of
Swiss securities, to implement a DVP mecha-
nism. Since DVP requires real time payment
finality in every transaction, it is only feasible
in RTGS payments systems.
20
In principle, DVP can also be used in foreign
exchange transactions, in which case it is called
payment-versus-payment (PVP). In reality,
however, PVP is extremely difficult to imple-
ment for transactions between dollars and other
major, non-North American currencies because
it would require that all three of the following
conditions are satisfied. First, payments sys-
tems for both currencies must be RTGS sys-
tems. Second, both payments systems must
have sizable overlapping operation times. And
third, both institutions involved in the transac-
tions must send the payment instructions in the
overlapped operation time period. Currently, the
main payments system used for settling the
dollar side of foreign exchange transactions in
the United States is CHIPS, which is a netting
system. In addition, Japan and most European
countries use netting systems, although many of
them are planning to move to RTGS systems
in the next few years. Further, the operation
hours of Fedwire, the RTGS system in the
United States, do not currently overlap with
those of most European or Japanese payments
systems. The Federal Reserve plans to extend
the operation of Fedwire to 18 hours a day by
the end of this year; still, it is not clear how
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54 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYWhile DVP eliminates credit risk, its costs are
likely to prevent it from being quickly or widely
adopted. First, DVP is costly to implement. In
addition to the above mentioned requirements,
it is also technically demanding on the informa-
tion and communication capacities of both pay-
ments systems and payments system users. For
example, to implement DVP for equity security
transactions, the payments system must be able
to store much more information on the payment
instruction. The instruction must not only iden-
tify the sender and the receiver(s) of a payment,
but also specify the particular security. This
additional information would require signifi-
cant investment in computers and data proces-
sing facilities. Further, a user of such a system
would have to integrate its departments respon-
sible for making and receiving dollar payments
and for transferring equity securities. In many
cases, this integration would require new com-
puter and data facility investment, as well as
corporate reorganization.
Another potential cost of DVP is that it could
exacerbate systemic risk. DVP allows a liquidity
shortage in a payments system to tie up the
clearing process of its linked systems. For ex-
ample, in an RTGS payments system, if a large
number of payment instructions have to be de-
layed due to a lack of liquidity, the operation of
a linked security clearinghouse will also be
slowed, perhaps even halted. Conversely, an
interruption in a security clearinghouse could
interrupt the operation of a linked RTGS system.
Thus, before DVP is implemented, its costs and
benefits should be weighed carefully.
Intraday liquidity provided by central banks.
As discussed earlier, the major systemic risk
concern in an RTGS system is the risk of a
liquidity shortage. This risk can be reduced by
increasing the liquidity held by its member
banks. Banks, however, understandably want to
economize on their liquidity holdings because
liquidity is costly. Further, because an individual
bank does not bear the entire cost of potential
chain reactions caused by its liquidity shortage,
it will choose a level of liquidity that is less than
what is collectively desirable.
21 
Concerned with the systemic impact of a li-
quidity shortage, central banks often provide
intraday liquidity to payments systems. The
Federal Reserve, for example, offers both col-
lateralized intraday loans and uncollateralized
daylight overdrafts to most member banks of
Fedwire. Collateralized loans are usually of-
fered in transactions related to Treasury securi-
ties, and the underlying securities are used as
collateral. On the other hand, the Federal Re-
serve also allows a member bank to have a
negative balance in its account at the Federal
Reserve during the day (daylight overdraft), up
to a preestablished limit without providing col-
lateral. In doing so, Fedwire minimizes liquidity
risk by effectively guaranteeing that the major-
ity of payment instructions are executed as soon
as they arrive to the system.
22
Providing intraday liquidity, however, can be
costly for central banks. For example, in Fed-
wire,  uncollateralized daylight overdrafts are
essentially loans to Fedwire members. Thus, the
Federal Reserve is exposed to the credit risk that
the borrowing banks may default on their loans.
In other words, central banks face a tradeoff
between reducing liquidity risk in payments sys-
tems and increasing credit risk to themselves.
The Federal Reserve chooses to bear some credit
risk primarily because it considers the systemic
impact and cost of a liquidity shortage in the
payments system much higher than the potential
credit risk exposed by providing uncollateral-
ized overdrafts.
23 
Faced with somewhat different tradeoffs be-
tween cost and risk, many European central
banks have chosen to provide only fully collat-
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 55eralized loans as their payments systems move
to RTGS systems. TBF in France, BIREL in
Italy, and CHAPS in United Kingdom are a few
such examples.
24 The central banks in these
countries will not extend loans in payments
systems unless a borrowing institution provides
collateral in the form of high-quality assets,
typically short-term government securities.
25 
When a central bank only provides intraday
liquidity through fully collateralized loans, it
does not bear any credit risk. Liquidity risk in an
RTGS system, however, is reduced but not
eliminated. Liquidity risk is reduced because
collateralized loans are cheaper to banks than
clearing balances—securities used as collateral
earn positive interest while clearing balances do
not. Liquidity risk is not eliminated, though,
because banks will economize on the amounts
of assets they hold as collateral, just as they
economize on their holdings of clearing bal-
ances. While collateralized loans are cheaper
than clearing balances, they are still costly in the
sense that the interest earned on collateral is
lower than other kinds of assets, such as corpo-
rate bonds or consumer loans. Therefore, banks
tend to hold more liquidity when collateralized
loans are available—now as the sum of clearing
balances and collateral—but less than what is
needed to eliminate liquidity risk.
26 
Credit and unwinding risk in netting
systems
While credit risk also exists in netting sys-
tems, the primary component of settlement risk
in these systems is unwinding risk.
27 Unwinding
occurs only when a netting system fails to settle.
Therefore, efforts to reduce unwinding risk con-
centrate on reducing the possibility of settle-
ment failures, which often include controlling
credit risk.
28 Various measures have been intro-
duced, and three are particularly well devel-
oped: bilateral credit limits for individual
participants and multilateral debit limits for the
system to control credit risk exposures,  collat-
eral requirements, and loss sharing agreements
to reduce unwinding risk.
Bilateral credit limits and multilateral debit
limits. Bilateral credit limits control the credit
risk to receivers at the individual institution
level. With bilateral credit limits, each partici-
pant specifies the maximum amount of net pay-
ment it would accept from every other
participant. Recall that accepting a payment is
equivalent to extending credit to the sending
party because payments are not settled when
they are sent. Thus, bilateral credit limits essen-
tially cap the maximal receiver risk at prespeci-
fied levels.
Each participant in the system is also subject
to a multilateral debit limit. Multilateral debit
limits specify the maximum aggregate net
amount an institution can owe to all other par-
ticipants of the system. Whereas bilateral limits
control the credit risk between any two institu-
tions, multilateral limits control the potential
shortfalls of the entire system to an explicit,
preestablished level when a participant fails to
pay its settlement obligations.
29 
While an individual institution sets its own
bilateral credit limits, its multilateral net debit
limit is often based on the sum of the bilateral
credit limits it receives from all other participants
in the system.
30 For example, assume Dates Bank
is a member of a netting system XYZ, which has
101 participants. Half of the participants set the
bilateral credit limit for Dates at $20 million,
while the other half set the limit at $10 million.
The rule of XYZ specifies that the multilateral
debit limit must equal 5 percent of the sum of a
bank’s bilateral credit limits. Thus, the multilat-
eral debit limit for Dates Bank would be equal
to 5 percent of $1.5 billion ($20 million times
50 plus $10 million times 50), or $75 million.
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ments, when properly combined with multilat-
eral debit limits, can significantly reduce
unwinding risk. A netting system can require
each of its participants to post collateral in a
system account, which will be liquidated to pay
for settlement if the participant fails to fulfill its
settlement obligations. To protect the system
from an unwinding, the collateral requirements
for a member could be set to equal its multilat-
eral debit limit. This way, settlement is guaran-
teed even if members of the system fail.  
While setting collateral requirements at the
level of multilateral debit limits would eliminate
unwinding risk, it would be costly. If the XYZ
netting system in the earlier example adopts
such an approach, Dates Bank would be re-
quired to provide $75 million of collateral in the
system account. Thus, few netting systems have
actually implemented such stringent collateral
requirements.
Loss sharing agreements. Loss sharing agree-
ments spread the cost of default in a netting
system among all members. Loss sharing agree-
ments specify the additional settlement obliga-
tions for each member when some participants
cannot fulfill their settlement obligations. With
loss sharing agreements, the impact of a partici-
pant’s failure to pay its obligations will not be
concentrated in a few institutions, thus reducing
the possibility of a chain reaction. Consequently,
the risks of settlement failure and unwinding are
reduced as well.
By combining loss sharing agreements with
multilateral debit limits and collateral require-
ments, a netting system can further reduce un-
winding risk at little additional cost to its
members. For instance, instead of requiring
each member bank to provide collateral equal to
its multilateral debit limits, a netting system
could require a member to provide collateral
equal to the maximum amount of loss that the
member is required to share. As long as the total
amount of collateral in the system account is
greater than the largest multilateral debit limit
granted by the system to its participants, settle-
ment is guaranteed even if the member with the
largest net debit position fails.
31 For instance,
using the earlier example, assume Dates Bank
fails with a total of $75 million in settlement
obligations. As long as the total amount of all
collateral posted in the system account is at least
$75 million, XYZ will still be able to settle.
A potential problem with loss sharing agree-
ments is that an individual member may extend
bilateral credit limits too aggressively because
it does not bear the full cost of a potential default.
One way to avoid such abuses of loss sharing
agreements would be to require that the shared
loss for each participant vary with the bilateral
credit limit it has set for the failed participants.
This way, it would be in a participant’s best
interest to set prudent bilateral credit limits. For
instance, assume Dates Bank fails with a total of
$75 million in settlement obligations. Then the
loss sharing agreements could require a bank
granting Dates a $20 million credit limit to pay
$1 million and a bank granting Dates a $10
million credit limit to pay $0.5 million.
32
CHIPS has adopted all three of these mea-
sures, significantly reducing settlement risk,
especially unwinding risk, to its members.
33
While a participant is free to set its bilateral
credit limit for another CHIPS participant, both
its collateral requirement and loss sharing obli-
gations vary with this limit. Thus, it is in a
participant’s interest to assess a counterparty’s
credit risk prudently and set the bilateral credit
limit accordingly. Further, with the loss sharing
agreement, the required amount of collateral in
CHIPS is relatively small, as are the costs of
posting collateral. With these measures imple-
mented, CHIPS is confident that it can settle
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multilateral net debit positions fail to pay their
settlement obligations. As a result, CHIPS has
significantly reduced its settlement risk.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The extraordinary growth in large-value pay-
ments systems has increased both the risk of a
settlement failure and the systemic impact of
such a failure. This article discusses how settle-
ment  risk differs in RTGS systems and netting
systems, and explores various measures to man-
age such risk. Settlement risk in these systems
is composed of credit risk, unwinding risk, and
liquidity risk. In RTGS systems, the main fo-
cuses of settlement risk are credit risk and li-
quidity risk. Credit risk can be eliminated by
using DVP, although DVP is costly. Liquidity
risk can be reduced if central banks provide
intraday liquidity. In netting systems, the main
focuses of settlement risk are credit risk and
unwinding risk. Credit risk in netting systems is
generally smaller than in RTGS systems, and it
can be further controlled by bilateral credit lim-
its. Unwinding risk can also be reduced signifi-
cantly by properly combining collateral
requirements with multilateral debit limit, and
preferably, loss sharing agreements.
Which kind of payments system is likely to
prevail? In Europe, the trend is moving toward
RTGS systems. The main rationale behind this
change is the concern of unwinding risk in net-
ting systems. In the United States, however,
CHIPS is likely to continue to be the biggest
large-value payments system since it has been
successful in reducing settlement risk, in par-
ticular, unwinding risk. Looking ahead, the suc-
cess of CHIPS could inspire the private sectors in
some European countries to set up similar sys-
tems. For these reasons, both RTGS and netting
systems are likely to continue to coexist in the
foreseeable future.
ENDNOTES
1 Large-value payments systems are also called wholesale
payments systems, as opposed to retail payments systems,
such as check clearinghouses.
2 For certain transactions, barter is an alternative. However,
this is rarely the case in large-value transactions. 
3 In addition to Fedwire, the Federal Reserve also operates
an electronic book-entry clearing system for government
securities, which is sometimes confused with Fedwire. The
confusion arises partly from the linkage established
between the two systems in recent years. The Federal
Reserve has linked these two systems to implement a
delivery-versus-payment (DVP) mechanism. With this
linkage, if a payment order is generated by a government
security purchasing agreement, the Federal Reserve will
execute the fund and security transfers at exactly the same
time on Fedwire and the book-entry system. This DVP
mechanism has many advantages, which will be discussed
later in the article.
4 The difference between the total credit and debit is called
a “net net position” in CHIPS. A participant is said to have
a negative net net position if its total debit is larger than its
total credit, a positive net net position if its total credit is
larger than its total debit.
5 Of course, a private bank could also serve as a settlement
agent. But due to the settlement agent’s pivotal role in
maintaining the stability of a large-value payments system,
thus its importance to the entire financial system, this
private bank’s bank would be under very close scrutiny of
the central bank. In practice, most large-value payments
systems use their central banks as the settlement agents.
6 If they do not have foreign branch offices, the transaction
would have to be completed through their foreign
correspondent banks. 
7 See the Bank for International Settlements (March 1996)
in the references.
58 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY8 The time difference was five hours instead of the usual
six hours because the United States was observing Daylight
Savings Time while West Germany was  not.
9 Another form of credit risk is the credit risk to a bank that
sends a payment on behalf of its customer, which is the risk
that the sending bank might have paid the funds with
finality only to find out that the customer does not have
proper funds to pay back the bank. This risk is present
whenever a bank provides overdraft service to its
customers. This risk will be omitted in the discussion
because it is not particular to settlement risk.
10 This assumes that the legal base for netting is well
established in the country in which the payments system is
located. To understand how different legal frameworks
might affect the risk exposure in a netting system, let us
look at the example in Table 1. In Table 1, suppose Ash
sends the instruction to pay Birch $15 million to a netting
system first. Once this instruction has been accepted by the
system, Ash has a legal obligation of $15 million. Now
suppose Birch then sends the instruction of paying Ash $10
million to the same payments system. How much is Ash’s
legal obligation then? In countries where the legal base for
netting is well established, its legal obligation now is the
net of the two payment instructions, which is $5 million.
This is called “netting by novation.” In other words, Ash’s
credit risk is at most $5 million. In some other countries
where the legal base for netting is lacking, however, Ash’s
legal obligation could still be $15 million.
11 As mentioned earlier, if the legal base for netting is well
established, then when one participant defaults on its
settlement obligations, its counterparties no longer have
the obligation to honor their payments.
12 Because of the potential impact of an unwinding, CHIPS
has implemented many risk control measures to reduce the
possibility of such occurrence, some of which will be
discussed later in the article.
13 In the real world, the differences of liquidity needs
between an RTGS and a netting system are typically much
more striking, because the number of banks in a payments
system and the cross traffic among the banks are much
higher. Further, gridlock could occur even if only one of
the banks does not have sufficient liquidity. It is
conceivable, however, that the banks could break up their
obligations and accomplish settlement by multiple
payments. For example, if Ash has $2 million of liquidity,
it could send out a payment instruction for $2 million to
Birch, relying on Birch to pay Cedar $2 million as soon as
it receives the funds, and Cedar to pay Ash. Then Ash could
pay out these $2 million again and the final settlement will
be achieved after enough number of cycles. This is in fact
the practice in SIC (see endnote 16). Still, significant
delays in settlement can be expected. Further, in a large
system with many banks involved, it is inevitable that
significantly more liquidity would be needed to guarantee
same day settlement.
14 Mathematically, this is equivalent to the claim that the
optimal solution is an interior solution, which holds with
only mild assumptions about cost structures.
15 A halt in an RTGS system implies settlement failure, just
as unwinding implies settlement failure in a netting system.
In this sense, a slowdown in an RTGS system can be
viewed as a partial settlement failure because it implies that
many payment instructions cannot be executed in time. 
16 SIC also designs a queuing mechanism. If there are not
enough funds in a sending bank’s clearing balance, the
payment instruction will be put into a queue to be processed
on a first-in-first-out basis when sufficient funds are
available. Further, a sending bank can cancel at will any
payment instructions waiting in the queue. This
arrangement allows a sending bank to break a large
payment order into several small pieces to be processed.
17 In 1993, on average only about half of the payment
instructions were completed by 2 p.m., but 95 percent of
the instructions had been initiated by that time.
18 Another example of such measures is to increase the use
of bilateral netting arrangements between institutions that
have many payment orders going both ways within
themselves. This will reduce both settlement risk exposures
and settlement cost regardless of the type of payments
system, RTGS or netting, being used.
19 The discussion will focus on settlement rules and
procedures. There are also many hardware improvements
that will reduce settlement risk, such as more powerful
computers, better telecommunication facilities, and better
backup systems. Since the costs and benefits of the
hardware improvements are easy to recognize, they will
not be discussed here.
20 Sometimes people use the term DVP loosely to describe
certain link arrangements between a monetary payments
system with some other clearing system, even if the former
is a netting system. But true DVP, as described in the text,
is only feasible for RTGS systems. Indeed, the potential for
risk reduction in DVP is an important factor in the decision
of European central banks to advocate RTGS systems.
21 In terminology, this is called an externality problem. 
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central bank, there could be excessive delays in execution
caused by liquidity shortage, which introduce uncertainties
as to when a particular payment instruction will be
executed. If a significant portion of payment orders are
delayed in a system, the system is effectively no longer real
time, which is a crucial property required by DVP.
23 In order to manage its credit risk exposure caused by
such overdrafts, the Federal Reserve has adopted two risk
control measures. One is the establishment of debit limits.
Since 1985, a net debit cap has been established for each
member bank, which could be three times as high as a
bank’s regulatory capital. The debit cap is “soft” in the
sense that a bank is allowed to exceed its debit cap. But
banks are strongly discouraged from doing so. If a bank is
found exceeding its debit cap repeatedly, it will receive
increasing administrative and regulatory scrutiny from the
Federal Reserve. Fedwire also has the option of rejecting
a payment instruction if accepting it would cause the
sending bank to exceed its debit cap. If a bank is unable to
maintain a positive balance in its account with the Federal
Reserve at the end of the day by its own fund or privately
borrowed fund, the overdraft would be viewed as a discount
window borrowing and proper collateral is required. The
other risk control measure is charging fees on daylight
overdrafts. Since April 1994, the Federal Reserve has
imposed a fee on daylight overdrafts to give banks a market
incentive to reduce their usage of overdrafts.
24 The German central bank is planning to provide partially
collateralized overdrafts for its proposed RTGS system.
25 In this case, the provision of liquidity can take the form
of either fully collateralized loans or intraday repurchase
agreements.
26 There is also a credibility issue. Since a central bank’s
policy of providing only fully collateralized loans will not
eliminate the possibility of liquidity shortage, private
sectors may expect central banks to step in with needed
liquidity, i.e., uncollateralized loans, when large-scaled
liquidity shortage occurs. In other words, the policy might
not be credible. After all, once a genuine liquidity shortage
occurs, it improves everyone’s welfare for central banks to
resolve the shortage. Therefore, central banks unwilling to
assume any credit risk might be, in fact, assuming much
liquidity risk. A perfect policy does not exist; there are only
choices with different tradeoffs.
27 As mentioned earlier, the legal framework for netting is
important as well, which is beyond the scope of this article.
28 There is also some effort to shorten the time length of
settlement cycles by increasing settlement frequencies.
Some countries, such as Germany, have planned to move
in this direction. The idea is that with a shortened cycle,
the total amounts of accumulated payments will be smaller
and so will the unwinding risk. Basically, this approach
moves a netting system toward the direction of an RTGS
system. Thus, such a change will reduce unwinding risk at
the expense of increasing liquidity risk. This tradeoff is
similar to the tradeoff between RTGS and netting systems.
29 The bilateral and multilateral credit limits in a netting
system are equivalent to the clearing balance in an RTGS
system. If the limits for an institution are set at zero, for
example, then the institution will not be able to send any
payments through the system. Thus, there is a tradeoff
between lowering the limits and smooth operation of the
system. 
30 These should be “hard” caps in the sense that they cannot
be exceeded. For example, in CHIPS, when a payment
instruction arrives, the central processing computer
updates the bilateral and multilateral net debit positions of
the sender (payer) and compares them with the
preestablished limits. If a bank’s payment will cause it to
exceed either of the caps, the payment instruction will not
be accepted or released to the receiver and the sender could
choose to delete it from the system.
31 A netting system that is able to settle even if one of its
participants with the largest net debit position fails to settle
is said to satisfy the first of a set of standards known as the
Lamfalussy criteria, “Lamfalussy one.”  Lamfalussy one is
now commonly accepted as one of the basic criteria that a
well-structured netting system should meet. Clearly, a
netting system that satisfies this criterion has much lower
unwinding risk.
32 The numbers in the example are obtained by assuming
that the loss sharing agreements specify that each
member’s share of loss is equal to the ratio of its the
bilateral credit limit to Dates Bank to the sum of all bilateral
credit limits Dates receives. Thus, a bank granting Dates a
$20 million bilateral credit limit has a share of 1/75 ($20
million over $1,500 million) of Dates Bank’s payment
obligations of $75 million, which is $1 million. Similarly,
a bank granting Dates a $10 million bilateral credit limit 
shares a loss of $0.5 million.
33 In fact, many of these risk management measures were
originated in CHIPS.
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